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SUMMARYEurope’s young, dynamic, high-growth firms are in a precarious
position, despite their pivotal role in bringing radically new innovations to
market. EU start-ups face higher entry and growth barriers than their coun-
terparts in the United States, and consequently Europe has fewer young
innovative companies(YICs) than the US. Those that Europe does have are
less R&D intensive. The main barriers to innovation are access to finance
and the difficulty that YICs have in accruing the benefits from their innova-
tions. In the current crisis, YICs must also adapt to a double whammy of
credit that is even more constrained than usual, and higher bankruptcy
risk. Policymakers must provide support for these firms, and they must get
their policy interventions right.
POLICY CHALLENGE
EU member state recovery programmes pay most attention to large, long-
established firms, and all but ignore young, radical innovators. This short-
term approach jeopardises the long-term benefits that breakthrough innova-
tions can bring. An EU YIC programme should first and foremost deal with
financial constraints, and should reward the risk-taking inherent in radical
innovation. Such a programme could be targeted to particular policy areas –
especially environmental technology development – would relate to the pre-
commercialisation stage of projects, would involve phased financing, and
would not include the typical
EU stipulation that projects
should involve cross-border
collaboration. However, project
applications and evaluation
should be pooled at EU level to
ensure highest standards of
excellence in the selection
procedure.
YICs
Young small
innovators
All innovators
% of innovators % of sales having
market novelties
3.9%
89%
100%
36%
18%
9%
8%
19%
Small
innovators
YICs: a rare but important source for
radical innovations
Source: author’s calculations.
This policy brief draws on research done
jointly with Cedric Schneider at the
University of Leuven, and on policy analy-
sis while at BEPA jointly with V Gaspar, I
Grilo, J Monteguado and G-J Koopman.
Research assistance by Martin Kessler at
Bruegel as well as comments from
Bruegel and other colleagues is gratefully
acknowledged.b
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A LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
Source: author’s calculations. Note: The total is
the sum of R&D and sales of all 226 leading
innovators in the matched sample. Young is
defined as founded after 1950. The US has 24
young leading innovators, Europe seven.
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Figure 1: Share of leading innovatorsby age cohort
Table 1
Contribution of young leading
innovators to total leading R&D
and sales: US and Europe
R&D Sales
US 28% 15%
Europe 2% 6%
Total 16% 12%
Source: author’s calculations. Note: Figure based on a sample of 226 companies, obtained from
matching firms in the FT Global 500 from 2007 with the 2007 EC-IPTS Top 1000 EU and non-EU R&D
scoreboard companies. Leading innovators are thus defined both by their market capitalisation and
R&D expenditures. The US has 80 companies in this sample, Europe 86 and other countries 60.
1 With thanks to the
ZEW (Zentrum für
Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung),
Mannheim, for supply-
ing access to the firm-
level data. Full analysis
of the data is reported
in Schneider and
Veugelers (2008).
In addition, if we focus on radically
new innovations that have the
potential to generate new markets,
young companies become even
more pivotal. Incumbent firms
spend more on R&D for incremen-
tal innovations that build on their
existing competences, but are less
active when it comes to radical
innovations that make their exist-
ing competences redundant
(Henderson and Clark, 1990,
Henderson, 1993). Small young
firms, not concerned with safe-
guarding existing skill-sets and
market positions, are more
inclined to introduce these radical
innovations. Baumol (2002)
reports an impressive list of major
innovations introduced by small
US firms during the last century.
Table 2 shows a selection from this
long list.
Baumol (2002) stresses that soci-
ety can only benefit fully from the
breakthrough innovations of
small, young firms if it has an
innovation system that effectively
links small and large firms, with
the latter following-up and improv-
ing the breakthrough innovations
of the former. The US is fortunate in
having this symbiosis. A less effi-
cient system, or one that impedes
young, radical innovators, might
R&D spenders. The European pic-
ture is much bleaker: the first
young company in the list is SAP
(founded 1972), Europe’s twenty-
second largest R&D spender.
Not only does Europe have fewer
young leading innovators, the
ones it does have are less R&D-
intensive than their US counter-
parts. The average R&D-to-sales
ratio of US young leading
innovators is 7.4 percent, almost
twice as high as the average US
ratio (3.85 percent). Europe’s few
young leading innovators have a
one percent R&D-to-sales ratio,
which is substantially below the
overall European ratio (2.5
percent). Young firms in the US
thus contribute even more to over-
all US R&D then to US turnover,
whereas in Europe this is not the
case (Table 1). This can mostly be
attributed to the different sectors
in which these young companies
operate. In the US, 70 percent of
young leading innovators are in
biotech (4) or ICT (13), while in
the Europe, only two are ICT firms.
THE EU-US GROWTH PERFORMANCE
GAP is often explained by the for-
mer’s lack of young, dynamic
high-growth businesses. The
evidence suggests indeed that
new EU firms face higher barriers
to entry, exit and growth compared
to their US counterparts (see eg
Bartelsmann et al 2004, Philippon
and Véron, 2008). Europe is miss-
ing out on the direct contribution
to growth from these firms, but is
also less likely to benefit from the
growth-enhancing innovations
they bring.
An examination of a sample of the
largest companies in terms of
market capitalisation and
research and development spend-
ing illustrates this. In the US (and
also other non-European
countries) young companies
make up a much larger proportion
of leading innovators than in the
Europe (Figure 1). Illustrative
examples are Microsoft (founded
1975), Amgen (1980) and Cisco
(1984), respectively the US’s
fourth, tenth and twelfth largestA LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
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Source: Own selection from Baumol (2002) .
Table 2
Major innovations by small US firms in the twentieth century
Air conditioning High-resolution CAT scanner Optical scanner
Biomagnetic imaging Hydraulic brake Pacemaker
Polaroid camera Kidney stone laser Quick-frozen food
Electronic spreadsheet Microprocessor Soft contact lenses
Heat sensor Magnetic resonance scanner Two-armed mobile robot
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Figure 2: YICs: a rare species in the
innovation eco-system
Source: author’s calculations.
2The label YIC (young
innovative company)
has become fairly
established. It was
introduced by a biotech
consortium proposing a
Europe-wide tax status
for young innovative
companies
(www.yicstatus.com).
France and Belgium
have already adopted
such a status, but using
different criteria (both
use the 15 percent R&D
to sales ratio, but
France has an age limit
of eight years, Belgium
10 years).
3EU state aid rules
define Young Innovative
Enterprises’ (‘YIEs’) as
being less than six
years old, externally
‘certified’ on the basis of
a business plan as
being capable of devel-
oping products or
processes that are tech-
nologically new or sub-
stantially improved, and
that are at risk of tech-
nological or commercial
failure, or have R&D
intensity of at least 15
percent in the last three
years or currently (for
start-ups).  See
www.ec.europa.eu/
competition/state_aid/
legislation/horizontal.
html
4Similar results are
found in the Flemish
CIS sample.
have a severe indirect impact on
an economy’s overall innovative
and growth performance.
One barrier to innovation is access
to finance (Hall, 2005).
Reputation and collateral are
important in accessing external
finance and consequently young
innovators are more likely to expe-
rience constraints than estab-
lished firms, particularly if these
young firms propose more radical
investment projects.
Moreover, young radical
innovators will be affected dispro-
portionately by a financial crisis.
Innovating companies that rely on
external financing, and who find it
more difficult to access external
finance because of their risk pro-
file, will be particularly hard hit by
malfunctioning financial markets.
Furthermore, in a recession with
high bankruptcy risks, the nega-
tive effect of credit constraints on
R&D investment is exacerbated for
firms at higher risk of bankruptcy
(Aghion et al, 2007).  As a conse-
quence, in the current combined
financial and real economy crisis,
young firms with radical innova-
tive projects are threatened by the
double whammy of constrained
credit and higher bankruptcy risk,
reducing the chances of new radi-
cal innovations that will lay the
foundations for future growth see-
ing the light of day. All this calls for
greater-than-usual government
support for young radical
innovators. 
It is one thing to make a case for
policymakers to pay particular
attention to this category of busi-
ness. It is another thing to get the
policy intervention right. We still
do not know enough to support
evidence-based policy design for
young radical innovators in the EU.
Are young innovative companies
indeed the most promising firms in
terms of radical innovations in the
EU? What obstructions do these
companies face? Can policy
intervention make a difference? 
This policy brief brings together
arguments from analysis and pro-
poses general and specific policy
recommendations. Empirical evi-
dence from the 2005 wave of the
German Community Innovation
Survey (CIS 4) is used
1. This is a
regular pan-European Eurostat
survey on the innovative strate-
gies of firms. We use the German
survey, as this includes informa-
tion on the age of the firms.
ARE YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
SPECIAL?
If young radical innovators
deserve policy attention, it is not
because they represent a large
share of EU GDP or employment,
nor will they ever account for a sig-
nificant proportion of EU R&D
expenditure.
The German sample confirms the
rarity of young, highly-innovative
companies. We define young
innovative companies (YICs) as
companies that have introduced
new products or process innova-
tions, that are less than six years
old, that have fewer than 250
employees and that spend at
least 15 percent of their revenues
on R&D
2. This definition is in line
with the revised EU state aid
rules, that allow for more
favourable treatment of young
innovative companies by EU
member states
3. 
Only four percent of the 1342
innovation-active companies in
the German CIS sample, qualify for
YIC status, representing 0.05
percent of sample employment
4.
They are particularly present in
knowledge-intensive, technologi-
cal sectors, specifically services
such as information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) services
and R&D services (Figure 2).b
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A LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
Source: Schneider and Veugelers (2008). Note: *** represent significantly different means between
YICs and other innovators at one percent significance level.
Table 3
YICs and radical innovative performance
Variables YICs
Other
innovators
Significant differ-
ence between YICs
and other innovators
Share of sales of new/improved products 0.600 0.261 ***
Share of sales of market novelties 0.360 0.072 ***
Source: On the basis of Schneider and Veugelers (2008). Note: the asterisks refer to the estimated
effect being statistically different from zero, with *** indicating a one percent significance level; ** a
five percent and * a 10 percent significance level; n.s. reflects a non-significant effect. Age and size
(measured through employment) are in logarithms. Also included are industry dummies. Number of
innovation-active firms used in the estimates (excluding East Germany): 1086.
Table 4
Effect of company characteristics on innovative performance
Share of sales with
new/improved products
Share of sales with
market novelties
Age of the company – * – **
Size of the company – * n.s.
R&D intensity +  *** +  ***
Basic R&D n.s. n.s.
YIC +  *** +  ***
5 ‘Basicness’ is meas-
ured by the relative
importance of
universities and public
research organisations,
as a source of input for
innovation activities
relative to suppliers and
customers.
6Note that the degree
of novelty is as
assessed by the
respondents them-
selves and may include
a subjective bias, which
may be stronger in
young hubristic
entrepreneurs.
THE RADICAL YICS
The evidence from German CIS
data supports the importance of
young, small innovative
companies, even if they are small
in numbers and size, as introduc-
ers of more radical innovations.
First, the innovative activities of
the YICs in this sample have a
much more ‘basic’ R&D profile
5.
Second, in terms of innovation out-
put, YICs have a substantially –
2.4 times – higher sales of new or
substantially improved products,
compared to other innovators. For
more radical innovations (mea-
sured as the share of sales of mar-
ket novelties – Table 3), the
performance differential for YICs
over other innovators is even more
impressive, at five times higher.
These summary statistics support
the notion that YICs’ superior inno-
vative performance emerges most
strongly for more radical innova-
tions, qualifying them as young
radical innovators
6.
Econometric analysis confirms
this superior innovative
performance by YICs (Table 4).
YICs achieve on average a higher
level of innovation performance
than other innovators. This result
is more emphatic for sales with
market novelties. It is important to
stress that the significant positive
result for YICs remains evident
after correcting for firm size, age,
R&D intensity and the ‘basicness’
profile of the firm’s innovation
strategy. This underlines why YICs
are not the same as small
innovators, or young innovators or
R&D-intensive innovators. Their
special character comes from
combining all in one: youth, small-
ness and a highly R&D-intensive
profile.
These superior innovative
performance results for YICs hold
up in the face of small changes in
the YIC definition criteria, such as
the age and size threshold. With
more substantial changes to the
criteria, particularly with respect
to R&D intensity, the target group
of companies becomes larger but
less exceptional in their innovative
performance, particularly on radi-
cal innovativeness (Schneider and
Veugelers, 2008).
To summarise, the evidence from
the German CIS data confirms the
presumption that young, small,
innovation-intensive firms are a
tiny, but distinct group, achieving
significantly higher innovative
sales, particularly the more radi-
cals ones,  than do other
innovation-active firms. Since rad-
ical innovations are those most
likely to trigger follow-up innova-
tions by incumbents, their ‘social’
return can be substantial. Thus,
impeding the innovative behaviour
of YICs could have a significant
broader impact. 
BARRIERS TO INNOVATION BY YICS
As already shown, YICs, which
combine the disadvantages of
smallness, youth, lower levels of
retained earnings and more risky
innovative projects, are more likely
to be financially constrained than
other small or young or innovative
firms.
A second barrier, arising from the
difficulty of appropriating the
returns from innovation, may also
impact YICs differently. Often lack-
ing the scale to accrue all the nec-
essary complementary assets for
successful commercialisation
(including access to distribution
channels or intellectual property
management), YICs may find itA LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 05
Source: Schneider and Veugelers (2008). Note: Respondents were asked to score each (potential)
hampering factor on a scale from zero (not relevant) to three (high). The numbers in the first two
columns indicate the share of firms that considered this factor to be relevant (ie firms that scored it
as one or more). The last column reports the difference in mean score. *** significantly different at
one percent, ** at five percent. Only a selection of barriers is reported. For the full results, see
Schneider and Veugelers, 2008.
Table 5
Obstacles to innovation
% firms reporting
barrier as relevant
Difference in
mean score
between YICs
and other
innovators  Barriers to innovation YICs
Other
innovators
External financial constraints 95.65% 75.75% -1.049***
Internal financial constraints 93.30% 66.42% -1.074***
Innovation costs too high 93.33% 87.71% -0.493***
Uncertain demand for innovative products 89.13% 74.60% -0.193
Difficulty of finding cooperation partners 67.39% 53.90% -0.323**
Resistance to change 52.17% 60.08% 0.180
7Again, as these data
reflect subjective evalu-
ations, the result could
be traceable to a bias if
YICs were more suscep-
tible to complain about
business conditions
than other innovators.
But even if this were
the case, the relative
ranking of barriers
remains interesting.
8This result for
financial barriers sur-
vives an econometric
analysis, correcting for
other firm and industry
characteristics
(Schneider and
Veugelers, 2008). The
econometric analysis
confirms that small
innovators are more
likely to be financially
constrained (both inter-
nally and externally),
and so are innovators
that have a more basic
innovative profile. But
on top of this, YICs are
significantly more likely
to be financially con-
strained both internally
and externally.
harder to appropriate the returns
from their innovations (eg Gans
and Stern, 2002). If YICs are less
able to capture the externalities
they generate, the divergence
between the social and private
rate of return on their R&D is larger.
YICs report higher obstacles to
innovation than other innovating
firms (Table 5)
7. When comparing
across barriers, the results con-
firm the presumption that
financial constraints – both inter-
nal and external – are the main
barriers to innovation for YICs.
Although this ranking also holds
for other innovating firms, the YIC
differential is largest on both
types of financial constraint and is
strongly statistically significant
8.
For other barriers to innovation,
there is unfortunately no factor in
the survey allowing a sufficiently
detailed assessment of the diffi-
culty YICs face in appropriating
returns on R&D investment. Only
when it comes to the problem of
finding partners is there a notably
(1996) provides an excellent
review of the literature on how to
deliver the necessary public fund-
ing in a risky environment without
losing the monitoring function of
private venture capital firms and
without trying to secure monitor-
ing through clumsy and costly
contracts. His analysis of the US
Small Business Innovation
Research subsidy programme con-
firms that positive findings were
confined to firms located in areas
that also had substantial private
venture capital activity.
The evidence from the German CIS
sample confirms this risk of
government failure. Although a
high share (40 percent) of YICs in
the sample receive subsidies,
once correcting for other firm,
industry and region characteris-
tics, YICs are not significantly
more likely to be receiving subsi-
dies – if YICs receive subsidies, it
is not because they are YICs. This
is consistent with the observation
that most German innovation
programmes do not specifically
target YICs. On average, receiving
R&D subsidies is associated with
higher innovative performance,
but this is not the case for YICs. In
fact, subsidised YICs do worse
than non-subsidised YICs in terms
of new/improved products. This
result applies even more for prod-
ucts with market novelties
(Schneider and Veugelers, 2008).
All this suggests that general sub-
sidy schemes do not account for
YIC-specific characteristics (such
as riskiness or radicalness) suffi-
ciently to leverage complementary
private funding and spur higher-
grade innovative performance.
These empirical results need to be
treated with caution at this stage,
but they do suggest that subsidies
higher effect for YICs, a result that
might signal obstacles to the indi-
rect effects of YICs interacting in
‘co-optition’ (a mixture of com-
petition and co-operation) with
other more established players
(Schneider and Veugelers, 2008).
A NEED FOR POLICY SUPPORT FOR
YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS?
Considering the combination of
barriers linked to the operation of
financial markets and to appropri-
ation of returns from innovation,
the case for government
intervention seems particularly
strong for young radical innovators
if society is to benefit from the
social returns from their more rad-
ical innovative efforts. 
Innovation policy typically
addresses the access-to-finance
problem, providing incentives such
as subsidies, loans or tax credits.
Effective government intervention
is, however, conditional on avoid-
ing government failure. LernerA LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
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9The need for policy
design to account for
the specifics of YICs is
also suggested by
Colombo et al (2008).
They found that new
technology-based firms
in Italy benefit more (in
terms of firm growth)
than mature ones from
financial support if pub-
lic funds are allocated
through a selective
evaluation process. 
must be carefully designed in
order to be effective
9.
A CALL FOR POLICY SUPPORT FOR
EU YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
The current economic crisis calls
for a swift reaction to support
young, small radical innovators.
EU member state recovery
programmes pay most attention
to large incumbent firms, ignoring
the young radical innovators, with
far less sizeable impact. This
approach focuses on the short-
term impact but jeopardises the
long-term social benefits from
breakthrough innovations. A com-
mitment to provide an ‘equivalent’
level of support to young radical
innovators, compared to large and
old incumbents, would improve the
balance.
Beyond the more immediate
response to the crisis, there is also
a more long-term need for this
type of instrument, which is
currently not part of the
innovation policy toolbox in many
member states or at EU level.
Beyond committing sufficient
resources to young radical
innovators, it is perhaps even
more important to get the details
right. What follows are directions
as to how policymakers should
design their interventions.
HOW TO DESIGN POLICY FOR
YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
First, since young radical
innovators need a symbiotic over-
all innovative and ‘co-optitive’
environment, any specific policy
for these firms must be part of
overall innovation and growth
policy. Second, a specific policy
approach should tackle the
barriers faced by young radical
innovators, at least those rooted in
market failure and where govern-
ments can act without inflicting
new barriers. Two preliminary
remarks before discussing the
design of such specific policies:
first, given that we still know very
little about what ‘medicine’ will
work for young radical innovators,
more emphasis should be put on
evaluating policy initiatives ex-
ante and  ex-post. Second, any
specific policy intervention should
avoid ‘lock-in’, whereby companies
stop growing in order not to lose
their aid status.
A specific policy for young radical
innovators implies first and fore-
most dealing with financial con-
straints. Supporting private capital
market development, especially
the high-risk, early-stage seg-
ments, is particularly important for
this because the efficiency of any
public funding improves when it
operates in tandem with private
venture capital. Public funding
programmes for young radical
innovators must be carefully
designed so that they reward the
risk-taking inherent in radical
innovation. For instance, because
a risky profile often translates into
a bimodal distribution of out-
comes – a high probability of large
returns, as well as big failures –
the focus should be more on
achieving these outcomes, rather
than reaching average/incremen-
tal results. Favourable tax treat-
ment of R&D can help finance
growth, particularly where tax
credits are payable even when the
firm is not making sufficient profit
to offset the value of the credits
against its tax bill.
Effective intellectual property
(IPR) protection is often essential
to enable young radical innovators
to raise finance, to access new
markets and to appropriate the
returns from newly-acquired mar-
ket positions. Young radical
innovators should be a particular
target group for reducing the cost
of IPR protection (Van
Pottelsberghe, 2009).
IMPLICATIONS FOR EU
POLICYMAKING
EU policy is important in terms of
the broader framework conditions
and the climate for innovation,
which young radical innovators
need (BEPA, 2008). Particularly
important are well-functioning and
large integrated products and
service markets, underlining the
importance of EU competition policy
and single market instruments.
In light of the access-to-finance
barrier for innovation, the financial
services sector warrants
particular attention. Having a more
open, integrated and competitive
EU financial sector is a necessary
condition for minimising the
access-to-finance barrier. In
particular, high-risk financing and
the early-stage venture capital
markets are pivotal. Removing
barriers to EU-wide venture capital
markets has long been on the EU
policy agenda, but has still not
been achieved.
Although innovative SMEs are at
the centre of EU innovation policy,
young radical innovators are rarely
a specific focus for EU instru-
ments, such as the Seventh
Framework Programme for
Research and Development and
the Competitiveness and
Innovation Programme. Recently,A LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
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BOX 1: A (GREEN) EU YIC PROGRAMME
The programme would fund project proposals from small, young businesses to help bring to market highly
innovative and groundbreaking ideas in EU Framework Programme-research areas.
• (Part of) the funding could be targeted to designated policy areas, such as climate change and energy. 
Funding would only relate to the pre-commercialisation stage of the project, where there are still major
uncertainties and financial market failures. Subsequent commercialisation would require the use of other
(private) funding. 
In view of the high risks/uncertainties involved, financing should be phased.
• Phase 1 (conceptual design) is a feasibility study to evaluate the scientific and technical merit of the
idea. Awards should be small and for a short period.
• Phase 2 (prototype development) is to expand on the phase 1 results. Amounts here are much larger and
for a longer period. 
• Phase 3 (commercialisation) should be an integral part of the proposal; selection should be based on
evaluation of the commercialisation strategy, but this phase should not be funded.
Projects should be evaluated on the basis of scientific and technical characteristics, but also and above all
on the expected (social) commercial returns. Evaluation should assess positively the risky and ground-
breaking nature of the project. This implies a mixture of expertise in the selection committee (not only sci-
entific but also technological, commercial and financial). Evaluation should be highly selectiveand conduct-
ed to the highest standards of excellence. This would make the programme a mark of quality (certification),
which will help selected participants attract additional current and later (private) funding (phase 3).
Funding should be directed towards innovative small firms only, as these suffer most from access-to-
finance barriers.
• Firms with more than 250 employees would qualify. But as there is also evidence that larger companies
face financial barriers, at least for highly innovative projects, the size threshold could be extended to 500
employees as long as firms pursue high-intensity, high-risk innovative activities.
• A special higher financing scheme should be envisaged when youngcompanies are selected.
Unlike most current EU funding programmes, there would be no requirement to collaborateon these projects
either nationally or internationally. As these projects seek to bridge the gap between the research phase and
the commercialisation phase, companies would be more reluctant to apply for funds if they are obliged to
collaborate. Bonuses might be considered for intra-EU collaboration, but should not be a condition of applica-
tion/selection.
Within the 2007-2013 EU budget, a total amount of €1.75 billion should be allocated to the programme. This
SMEs, particularly young radical
innovators. The proposed pro-
gramme awards funds for high-
risk, innovative projects planned
by young and small companies,
during the critical start-up and
development stages, when
financial market barriers are at
their highest. In addition, it
encourages the commercialisation
of the project in later stages. If
implemented properly, the plan
will not only enhance the chances
of projects being funded but would,
through certification, reduce
barriers in later project phases by
easing access to private venture
capital investment. The proposal is
based in large measure on the US
Small Business Innovation
Research programme (Lerner,
1996), and is in line with the EU’s
subsidiarity principle.
new state aid rules for innovation
have identified young innovative
enterprises. Identifying this group
in EU soft law is a big step towards
more targeted national level
policy. It should also be used in the
EU’s own funding programmes. 
Box 1 puts forward an EU-level pro-
posal for redressing financial mar-
ket failure at the pre-commerciali-
sation phase affecting innovativeb
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A LIFELINE FOR EUROPE'S YOUNG RADICAL INNOVATORS
would come close to three percent of total EU budget spending on research and innovation.
The programmeshould be designed as a pilot, evaluatedand adjusted or terminated if unsuccessful.
Arguments for an EU-level approach:
• Economies of scale in the selection procedure, and competition among applicants at EU level guarantees
high-quality projects (cf the European Research Council). 
- A higher degree of excellence in the evaluation stage can be assured because of selection of evalua-
tors from a wide – even world-wide – geographical base. 
- By pooling applications at EU level, it will make it easier to establish high-quality networks of experts,
willing to evaluate top-quality projects and further supporting private venture capital demands of the
next stage.
- This can thus set in motion a virtuous circle of supply and demand in which a steady increase in good-
quality projects will in turn trigger more financing.
• By targeting areas with high probability of international spillovers, such as climate change and energy,
the EU supports complementary areas in which individual countries might under invest. In addition, tar-
geting green projects supports the EU’s broader climate change goals by improving, through innovation,
the efficiency of mitigation and abatement policies. 
• Increasing the likelihood of commercialisation in EU-FP research areas will improve the leverage from past
and present EU R&D funds into EU growth and jobs, directly addressing Europe’s failure to leverage its
strength in research into commercial success. 
• The non-funded commercialisation strategy should involve the dissemination of the innovations through-
out the EU market and beyond.
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